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Cadres into Managers: Structural Changes  
of East German Economic Elites before and after  
Reunification 
Heinrich Best∗ 
Abstract: In East-Germany, the processes of democratic 
transition and market transformation took a form that was 
particular and distinctive from other post-communist coun-
tries: Nowhere else was the transfer of institutions of market 
economy, the elimination of the old regime, and the inclu-
sion into the frameworks of supra national markets so sud-
den and so radical than in the former GDR. Our paper ex-
plores the formation of entrepreneurs and of the higher ech-
elons of management in the manufacturing industry after 
unification from a long term perspective. Particular empha-
sis is given to the starting configuration of East-Germany’s 
transition to an open market economy, and to the “afterlife” 
of the GDR’s economic elite after unification. It can be 
shown that some of the structural and attitudinal differences 
between East and West-German economic elites can be at-
tributed to GDR inheritance, whereas other differences have 
emerged as an adaptation to East-Germany’s subordinate 
status in the German economic system. Other developments 
can be seen to have resulted in a convergence between Wes-
tern and Eastern parts of Germany.  
The paper is based on survey data and processed-produced 
data gathered by the DFG funded Collaborative Research 
Programme: “Social Developments after Structural Change. 
Discontinuity, Tradition, and the Formation of Structures 
(SFB 580)”. 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Heinrich Best, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-
Schiller-Universität Jena, Carl-Zeiß-Str. 2, 07743 Jena, E-Mail: best@soziologie.uni-
jena.de. 
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Research questions and data sources 
The (re)transformation of a socialist economy into a capitalist one has been 
compared to the restoration of a gelding into a stallion: both operations are 
highly complicated, both involve the reassembly of previously dissected com-
ponents using both old and replacement parts, both require a vital piece to be 
replaced for a successful retransformation, and in both cases the test for success 
is how it works and not how it looks. In the restoration of capitalist economy 
the vital piece is a body of entrepreneurs and managers who are willing and 
able to execute and apply the rules and mechanisms of capitalist market econ-
omy. They are the actors and agents of economic transformation whilst the 
general population is reduced to a largely consummatory, sometimes suffering 
and occasionally protesting role. This paper deals with the formation of a body 
of entrepreneurs and managers in what was the GDR and is now East Germany 
(excluding West-Berlin as a fragment of the old West).  
Its main subject is to examine the structural side of the formative process 
which involves the recruitment and career patterns, training, socialisation, and 
general social ‘embeddedness’ of  East German executive directors  and man-
agers (including their social origin and choice of spouse). These analyses are 
cross-sectional, starting in 1989 (the last year of the GDR as a 40 year old 
‘mature’ communist regime), and ending in 2003 (the final year of the Jena 
management survey).  
Our empirical evidence consists of two main bodies of data: one is a 
download of 13.749 biographies from the GDR’s ‘Zentraler Kaderdatenspei-
cher’ (Central Cadres Database) which was constructed during the 1980s under 
the auspices of the GDR’s Council of Ministers (Best and Hornbostel 1998; 
Best and Gebauer 2000; Best and Hornbostel 2003). With records covering 
approximately 700.000 persons including the whole ‘functional’ elite and the 
upper echelons of the GDR’s service class (but excluding full time party func-
tionaries and officers in the military and the security  apparatuses) this unique 
data source provides us with full records of their social and political family 
backgrounds, their family situation in the 1980s, their occupational careers, ed-
ucational backgrounds, party and organisational affiliations, status in the no-
menclature and further information regarding their position as cadres (such as 
foreign language skills, entitlement to travel into non-socialist countries etc.). 
Altogether it provides an immensely valuable source for studies into vertical 
and horizontal differentiations of a socialist society and particularly for those 
researching the formal and informal mechanisms of recruitment and careers 
within of the cadres’ apparatus. The subset of about 13.5000 persons used for 
our paper includes all directors and heads of department of the GDR’s nation-
ally owned (i.e. state run) manufacturing industry (mainly vehicle industry and 
mechanical or electrical engineering) that held their positions at some time in 
1989. The download from the central cadres database was designed to match 
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the target population of the Jena management study in 2003 which provides a 
representative sample of executive directors and entrepreneurs of middle and 
smaller firms in the German manufacturing industry (n = 749) (Martens, Mi-
chailow and Schmidt 2003). 
These two databases allow for detailed structural analyses of the bodies of 
managers and directors of a core segment of (East-)German industry immedi-
ately before the end of communism and after 13 years of post-communist tran-
sition and inclusion into the ownership structures of West German and interna-
tional capitalism. To bridge the time gap between these two cross-sectional por-
trayals, we refer to several other management studies performed in the 1990s, in 
particular to an earlier survey of East German managers carried out by a group 
of Jena researchers in 1997 (Gergs, Hausmann and Pohlmann 1997; Gergs and 
Pohlmann 1999). 
Based on these data-sources the following main research questions are ad-
dressed: 
1) Was there in the GDR as diagnosed in other communist societies – an 
emergence of a ‘technocratic managerial elite’ (King and Szelenyi 
2004:128) that formed the core of a ‘New Class” (Bakunin 1870) or a 
‘New Technocracy’ (Ludz 1967), being distinct from and conflicting 
with an old ‘bureaucratic estate’ that defended its control of the reins of 
power? What was the degree of and what were the distinctive features 
of ‘classness’ of the ‘New class’ and in particular of its technocratic-
managerial core? Are there indications that it was able to reproduce it-
self as a class? 
2) What was the fate of the ‘technocratic-managerial elite’ in the pro-
cesses of transition and post communist transformation since the late 
1980s? Was there a ‘purge’ of the cadres of GDR firms followed by the 
establishment of a predominantly new and overwhelmingly West Ger-
man management in the East – as suggested  by theories of ‘colonialisa-
tion’ –, or was there a significant survival and continuing employment 
of an East German technocratic-managerial elite in the service of West 
German and foreign capital owners – i.e. the formation a kind of East 
German ‘compradores’ management, being locally in charge but an-
swering to external centres of control? Or did the managerial elite and 
the directorate of East German Economy transform into a new post-
socialist bourgeoisie which acquired autochthonous property rights and 
autonomous entrepreneurial authority? 
3) Fifteen years after the fall of the wall and fourteen years after reunifica-
tion, are there still east-west differences to be found in the managerial 
and technocratic strata of German economy? Are these differences an 
inheritance from the GDR or have they emerged after reunification as 
an adaptation to East Germany’s subordinate status in the German eco-
nomic system? Are east-west differences in the composition of the 
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management of German companies likely to affect the performance of 
German economy at large, are they potentially dangerous as a starting 
point for an east-west cleavage and do they have a complement in the 
attitudes and general behavioural orientations of East and West German 
managers? (The latter research question will be addressed in R. Schmidt’s 
paper). 
Structure and change of GDR’s managerial  
stratum in the late 1980s 
The notion of a ‘new technocratic and managerial elite’ has been inspired by 
developments in Central East European countries like Hungary where there 
was a massive turnover within the managerial and technocratic stratum before 
1980, with highly qualified young professionals accessing vacant positions and 
even the development of a body of ‘socialist entrepreneurs’, foreshadowing the 
end of communism (Lengyel 1987; Szelény 1988). None of this can be said 
about the socialist directorate and ‘managerate’ of the GDR economy. On 
average the cadres of the GDR’s manufacturing industry had held leading posi-
tions heads of department as for 13 years (directors: 20 years) and were be-
tween 48 and 49 years old. About 23% of the cadres had been in such a posi-
tion for five years or less, but 22% had held a leading function for 20 years or 
more. About two in five directors and one in three of the other leading cadres 
were over 54 years old. These data indicate a rather low turnover in the mana-
gerial stratum of the GDR economy. In fact there were complaints and even a 
semi-public discussion about the geriatric state of the GDR cadre system (Best 
and Hornbostel 1998). Quite obviously, in the GDR a ‘new technocratic-man-
agerial elite’ had not yet taken over. Changing recruitment patterns show, how-
ever, that the managerial stratum of the GDR’s service class was transforming 
and that the overall impression of its rather traditional makeup – traditional in 
the sense of a recruitment pattern which was domineered by non-academic 
qualification (64%), working class origin (59%), high level of communist party 
membership (64%), and cultural parochialism (only 16% displayed certified 
English language skills) – was due to a retarded process of replacement circula-
tion (Table 1). 
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In most of these respects we see strong and coherent trends towards more 
professional qualification structures and less ideology-based recruitment pat-
terns amongst the younger cohorts of the managerial stratum in 1989. In order 
to trace these changes we have divided the population of managers and direc-
tors (in so far as they were in the age range, 35 to 64 years) into age cohorts of 
five years. Results for the  categories of the eldest (65 and older) and youngest 
(34 and younger) managers have to be interpreted with caution, because we 
should be aware that in the case of ‘survivors’ beyond retirement age (3% of 
the population) and very early starters, who were in their early 30s when they 
got into leadership positions (5% of the population), particular selection and 
recruitment mechanisms, which distinguished them from other cohorts with a 
‘normal’ career pattern, were at work. It should also be noted that there are 
only 5 directors in the youngest age bracket, which excludes this category from 
percentage calculations (Graph 1). 
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These reservations do not, however, obscure the clear trends in our data, 
which reveal a picture of growing social differentiation and distinctiveness of 
managers’ recruitment patterns. The share of leading cadres with a ‘certified’ 
working class origin dropped from between 74% and 65% in the oldest cohorts 
to 32% and 40% in the youngest cohorts of directors and managers (Graph 2). 
If we consider that – according to another study (Best 2003: 498-500) – the 
category ‘working class origin’ was systematically inflated by between a quar-
ter and a third of its size to meet criteria of ideological desirability, and that it 
included officially persons who originated from households of full time party 
officials and army officers, the trend of a deproletarisation of managerial re-
cruitment patterns becomes even more clear. Instead we see a sharp rise in 
recruitment from parental backgrounds which were classified as intelligenzia, 
employees, or ‘others’ – where we find the undesirable categories of commu-
nist societies, such as entrepreneurs, independent craftsmen, farmers or the lib-
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eral professions. In the youngest cohorts of directors and managers 19% or 
16% respectively were recruited from the intelligenzia and 23% or 26% respec-
tively were recruited from the category ‘others’. 
 
 
The shift towards a less ‘proletarian’ social origin and consequently the dif-
ferentiation of recruitment patterns of cadres in the GDR manufacturing indus-
try is underlined by data from the 2003 Jena management study which shows 
that 44% of East German managers, who had been leading cadres in 1989, had 
fathers who had been either leading cadres themselves or who had been self-
employed1. A further 38% came from working class households with fathers 
who had been predominantly employed as skilled workers or foremen. The re-
maining 18% had fathers who had been employees in subordinate positions. 
                                                             
1  For the Jena Management study see the contributions of Bernd Martens and Rudi Schmidt 
in this volume. 
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The corresponding percentage values for West German managers and entrepre-
neurs who had held leading positions in 1989 were 67%, 20% and 13%, which 
indicates a difference in degree but not a categorical distinction of managerial 
recruitment patterns between East and West. The managerial stratum of the 
East German service class was apparently transforming into a self-reproductive 
formation and losing its character as a channel for upward mobility. 
 
 
A similar process of deproletarisation can be seen in intermarriage patterns 
(Graph 3). Here the Central Cadres Database provides us with a more differen-
tiated system of social classifications which allows for a precise identification 
of privileged social categories of GDR society. If we add up spouses who had 
been either members of the intelligenzia, or who worked in the apparatus of the 
communist party (SED), or who occupied leading positions in the state admini-
stration and in the economy we see a dramatic increase of isogamy in younger 
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age cohorts, reaching 48% amongst directors and 37% amongst heads of de-
partments. The youngest cohort should be not considered here in either group, 
because too many of its members were not yet married.  
 
 
The processes of increasing differentiation (and particularly deproletarisa-
tion) of social recruitment and growing isogamy of intermarriage patterns were 
complemented by a dramatic increase in the qualification levels of directors 
and heads of departments, with more than two thirds of the former and more 
than half of the latter in the age group of those who were born between 1951 
and 1955 being university trained. (Again we should omit the youngest manag-
ers from our consideration, because a time consuming university education was 
at once an asset as well as a hindrance in a career which led to the higher eche-
lons of socialist management). Approximately half of the university degrees 
were in natural sciences or engineering, the other half in socialist economics 
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including their equivalent of business administration. With a share of 6%, so-
cial sciences were of minor relevance in all degrees recorded (Graph 4). How-
ever, some directors – typically at the highest levels of concerns (Kombinatsdi-
rektoren) – were sent to party academies to receive an additional ideological 
confirmation (nicknamed ‘infrared treatment’) and to put them on equal terms 
(at least with regard to their political instruction) with their high ranking coun-
terparts in the party apparatus. Such qualifications have been not included in 
the breakdown of degrees reported here. Increasing levels of education went to-
gether with an improvement of ‘cultural competences’, which means that more 
than a third of the directors and about a quarter of the managers in the youngest 
age cohorts had obtained certified English language skills (Graph 5).  
 
 
If increasing levels of formal education can be rightly interpreted as indica-
tors of growing professionalisation, this development was, however, not ac-
companied by a marked and consistent fall in the degree of party affiliation 
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(Graph 6). There is only a slight indication of an increase in the gap between 
the directorate, which maintained a level of communist party membership well 
above 90% over all age groups since the 1931-1935 birth-cohort, and the man-
agement, which displays a slight and inconsistent downwards-trend from 67% 
in the 1926-1930 birth cohort to 50% among those who where born after 1956. 
In any case, communist party membership remained a requirement for those 
who strove for an ascent to the highest levels of socialist management. How-
ever, with an average age of 26, entry into the party of power was executed 
rather late – late, compared to other segments of the GDR’s service class and 
the power elite, such as high administrative officials or high ranking party 
officials. This also applies to directors, 26% of whom entered the communist 
party at the age of 30 or over. In these cases we can assume that entry into the 
party was a somewhat belated proof of loyalty and adherence to the regime by 
contenders for a managerial career who had previously demonstrated their pro-
fessional aptitude on different grounds.  
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All in all, we can conclude that a ‘new’ managerial-technocratic counter-
elite had not (yet) formed in the GDR, let alone ascended to the commandeer-
ing positions of its polity and society. Instead, most of the elevated managerial 
and directorial positions of its core industries were occupied by cadres who had 
been in charge since the 1970s or even the 1960s. The make up of the GDR’s 
managerial stratum still bore the traits of the late 1950s and early 1960s period 
when bourgeois specialists had been replaced by proletarian persons of practice 
who owed their careers to the communist party. This recruitment and career 
pattern began to change, however, with an influx of a younger generation of 
managers – the ‘yuppies’ of socialist economy – who bore the traits of profes-
sionalism and were predominantly recruited from non-working-class back-
grounds and increasingly connected to privileged quarters of GDR-society by 
intermarriage. Their training provided them either with the technical expertise 
to construct products and design production, or with the organisational skills to 
run a department or a factory in the labyrinthic system of socialist economy. 
Communist party membership was still a career requirement for directors, but 
lost some of its importance for heads of department. If necessary, membership 
could be acquired at a later stage of the career. Although the ‘New Class’ had 
not yet formed, in 1989 we can see a marked generational cleavage within the 
corps of cadres of the GDR economy, predestining the members of younger 
cohorts for a continuation of their careers and marking the elder for an exit into 
early retirement when socialism collapsed and capitalism triumphed in 1990.  
While the managers and technocrats of the GDR economy had not contrib-
uted to the downfall of the old regime, they had, however, also done nothing to 
‘save’ the GDR from disintegrating or to continue the experiment of socialism 
– which some GDR intellectuals had attempted in vain. With very few excep-
tions the cadres of the GDR economy were prepared to welcome their col-
leagues from the capitalist West who came to explore what was worth picking 
up from the rubble of socialist economy.   
Exit, choice and liability: the formation of a post-
communist management in East Germany 
Astonishingly little research has been done in the turbulent transition of the 
cadres of GDR’s socialist economy into the world of capitalist management. 
Reliable data about the composition of the ‘new’ East German management 
which was the outcome of elite circulation and primary accumulation after the 
regime change of 1990 do not exist before the mid 1990s (Pohlmann and 
Schmidt 1996; Windolf 1996; Gergs, Hausmann and Pohlmann 1997; Gergs 
and Pohlmann 1999; Schreiber et al. 2002; Martens, Michailow and Schmidt 
2003). Scattered evidence tells us, however, about a partly spontaneous clean-
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sing, in which the workforces of East German plants ridded themselves of 
managers they considered as incompetent and/or mere minions of the commu-
nist party, and about external intervention, whereby western – mainly West 
German – investors or the Treuhand Trust Agency (which was formally in 
charge of the privatisation of the GDR’s nationalised economy) decided the 
fate of East German managers. 
In fact, in most cases a multipartite bargaining process seems to have taken 
place which involved all the actors mentioned, plus East German managers 
whose insider knowledge and technical skills were considered to be indispen-
sable to continue production and to prepare the hand-over of enterprises to their 
new owners (BvS 2003). In many cases, particularly with regard to small or 
middle sized businesses, the new owners were in fact ‘old’ owners who had 
initially survived the first wave of nationalisation after WW II and who had 
been expropriated at some stage after 1949. Between the early 1990s and 2003 
about 17.000 East German businesses were re-privatised. Larger businesses 
were usually sold or otherwise transferred to investors, whereby foreign inves-
tors acquired around 6% of the Treuhand Trust Agency’s portfolio and guaran-
teed significantly more than 10% of all jobs and investment commitments. 
Resulting from this complex mode of re-privatisations was a hierarchically 
differentiated ownership structure, whereby the proportion of firms under East 
German ownership and with a regional locus of economic control decreases 
from about 74% of all businesses including small and very small businesses (on 
average 16 employees), to about two thirds, if middle size businesses form the 
lower bound (on average 100 employees), to less than five percent, if only 
larger and stock companies are considered. 
From the late 1990s until today East Germany’s economy is distinguished 
by a heterogeneous ownership structure with ‘colonialists’, ‘compradors’ and 
‘autochthonous’ entrepreneurs coexisting and the likelihood of the locus of 
economic control shifting from East to West Germany dependent on the size of 
the business in question – the larger the more likely. Managers from East and 
West German backgrounds were actively involved in this process of transfor-
mation, some of them through Contract Management Agreements which trans-
ferred the responsibility and competence for the privatisation of a firm to them 
and consequently gave them an advantage if they were interested to become 
proprietors themselves. 
In the mid 1990s, when the dust of (re)privatisation began to settle, the new 
East German management structure became apparent. It could be clearly dis-
tinguished from the stock of economic cadres in the GDR as well as from the 
management of West German companies. The most obvious divergences be-
tween the East German cadres and management systems before and after reuni-
fication and privatisation were its size and the presence of a West German 
element after 1989. During the first half of the 1990s about two thirds of the 
leadership positions which had existed in the GDR economy in 1989 were 
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axed, while between 25% and 13% of the managers working in East Germany 
had lived in West Germany before 1990. The share of migrants from the West 
increases in relation to the height of the position. According to the Jena Man-
agement study of 2003, which provides the most recent data on the subject, 
30% of the executives of the East German manufacturing industry come from 
the West, whereas only 1% of equivalent positions in the West are filled with 
East Germans. These data show that job-opportunities for managers with an 
East German origin have clearly deteriorated during the 1990s and that this 
development has not been compensated for by an improvement of their oppor-
tunities in the West. On the other hand we see that the overwhelming majority 
of senior management positions in East Germany, including positions at execu-
tive level, are nevertheless presently occupied by native East Germans. Our 
2003 data also show that up until today more than four out of five (82%) of 
native East German executives in the manufacturing industry have held leading 
position in the GDR’s cadre system before 1990. In 1989, 46% of these ex-
cadres had been working in research and development or production, 25% had 
already risen to executive positions and the remaining 30% were involved in 
administration and planning. This distinguishes them clearly from their West 
German counterparts, 45% of whom had held executive management positions 
in 1989, and only 18% had a non-executive position in the areas of research 
and development or production. Compared to their West German counterparts 
a considerably larger proportion of East German managers has risen to their 
present executive positions since 1989 and has had a professional background 
in research and development or production rather than in administration or 
marketing. 
The selective mechanisms working here favoured GDR cadres with formal 
technical and scientific qualifications. Of East German executive managers in 
the manufacturing industry 68% hold a degree in engineering compared to 38% 
of their West German counterparts who have prominently graduated in eco-
nomics and business administration (West German managers: 40%, East Ger-
man managers: 22%). In this respect the population of survivors from the 
GDR’s cadre system is also clearly distinguishable from the total population of 
GDR leading cadres in the manufacturing industry in 1989, only 20% of whom 
had graduated in the technical or natural sciences. It is somewhat paradoxical 
that in East Germany a managerial ‘technocracy’ was the product and not the 
producer of the end of communism. 
The rigorous selection mechanisms implemented during the period of re-
placement circulation in the first half of the 1990s favoured younger cohorts of 
GDR cadres, who were better trained, linguistically less parochial, and a better 
social match (in terms of social origin and connubium) for their potential west-
ern counterparts and superiors. Nevertheless we observe a remarkable ability of 
some senior and particularly of middle aged cadres to survive in managerial po-
sitions under capitalist conditions (Table 2). The first Jena management study 
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of 1997 (which targeted managers in the manufacturing industry) showed that 
66% of the respondents were 45 years and older and that the strongest age 
cohort (24%) was made up by those who were born between 1941 and 1945. 
This result has been confirmed by other management studies carried out in the 
mid 1990s and traces can even be found in the 2003 Jena management survey 
whereby the middle-aged cohorts, including those who where born during the 
1940s, are significantly stronger than in the West. 
Table 2: Age distribution of senior managers, executives and directors in the 
East German/GDR manufacturing industry 1989, 1997 and 2003 in percent 
(2003 also West German managers). Born … 
 
 since 1956 
1951-
1955 
1946-
1950 
1941-
1945 
1936-
1940 
1931-
1935 
before 
1931 all N 
1989   5.1 10.8 13.2 18.6 27.7 14.4 14.5 100 13745 
1997 18.5 21.0 17.2 24.1 13.4   4.4   1.3 100    157 
2003 
East 27.1 23.9 20.0 21.2   6.3   0.8   0.8 100    255 
2003
West 43.9 13.2 15.0 16.8 8.5   1.0   1.6 100    494 
 
Factors favouring late-middle age groups of the GDR management in the 
process of transition can be found in the social capital accumulated during their 
careers as socialist cadres and their ability to reinvest it during the turbulent 
times of transition in the organisation of efficient ‘rope-teams’ (Seilschaften). 
These were parties which formed on the basis of a mutual interest in exploiting 
the opportunities offered by the unsettled situation of transition. It was particu-
larly interesting to have West Germans in the team who had access to valuable 
resources and could act as ‘interpreters’ in the new institutional order of market 
economy and representative democracy. Senior GDR cadres found it easier 
than their junior colleagues to establish Western connections since a much 
higher proportion of senior cadres had been entitled to travel to non-socialist 
countries for business trips before 1990 (Graph 7). In many cases continuous 
business relations had been firmly established with West German companies 
that virtually integrated GDR plants into the capitalist process of production 
and distribution. It was plausible to continue this cooperation after 1989 and to 
develop it into mergers with the GDR companies being the subordinate part-
ners and their helpful management being rewarded with regional executive 
power. This configuration clearly favoured those GDR cadres who were in 
charge in 1989, without being obviously incompetent or loathed by their staff. 
Per se, links to the old regime and even STASI involvement was of no rele-
21 
vance for West German business partners, as long as it did not create any un-
pleasant public noise. 
 
 
Another factor favouring middle-age cadres over younger ones was the gen-
der distribution. Seventeen percent of all leading GDR cadres in the manufac-
turing industry were woman. In the mid 1990s the female share in the target 
populations of various East German management studies had decreased to be-
tween 6% and 10%. In the 2003 Jena management study 8% of East German 
and 7% of West German executive managers are women. These aggregate data 
show a significant, although not dramatic process of ‘masculinisation’ of the 
East German management in the process of transition. It was obviously an 
advantage to be a man when it came to entering the career avenues of capitalist 
management (Graph 8). Our data also indicate that the process of female gen-
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der de-selection was linked to seniority and hierarchy, in so far as in the GDR 
manufacturing industry the female share was only spurious at directorial level 
in all age groups and decreased dramatically at head of department level in 
older cohorts. Those who were in charge and who had accumulated the social 
capital to extend their career avenues into the new era were predominantly 
male.  
 
 
Today’s East German managerial and entrepreneurial stratum can be seen as 
a crossbreed between the communist cadres system and the capitalist manage-
ment system. The selection and recruitment processes of the transition period 
have created a hybrid social entity which is clearly distinguishable from its 
GDR forerunners as well as from its West German counterparts. To refer back 
to the initial ‘hippos’ metaphor, given the problem of many East German com-
panies to adapt to the world of market economy and in particular to develop 
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successful marketing strategies for technologically sophisticated products, some 
doubts have to be expressed as to whether a fully intact stallion has been restored. 
On the other hand we see an impressive display of stallion-like attitudes, in 
particular by the strengthening of patriarchal management styles and an inclina-
tion to maintain hierarchical structures. 
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